![]() Nov. 2, 2006 County voting security measures memo
Date: Nov. 2, 2006 Cable channel HBO is airing a special tonight, Thursday, Nov. 2 at 9:00 p.m. about local activist Bev Harris’ fight against electronic voting systems. The program is entitled “Hacking Democracy.” Read about it online at http://www.hbo.com/docs/programs/hackingdemocracy/synopsis.html. As a representative of a county using electronic voting equipment, you may receive questions and phone calls about our machines and processes. Our staff is committed to open, transparent elections, and our first priority is accurate and secure elections and the facts below should provide answers for the questions you receive. . Studies of jurisdictions nationwide that experienced problems with vote counting equipment share a common theme: inadequate poll worker training and insufficient procedures. King County carefully tracks lessons learned across the nation and has implemented many best practices and security standards. In King County, each polling place is staffed by sworn election workers, who have attended several hours of mandatory training. There are numerous checks and balances in place, including separation of duties as each voter moves through the polling place. Although press has been allowed to screen the documentary, we have not and can only respond to what is on the website. I am not opposed to a balanced documentary about elections, but the accusations made by Bev Harris through the documentary airing on HBO and on her web site don’t add up. Ms. Harris and other critics of electronic voting play a valuable role in the democratic process by championing reforms, like the voter verifiable paper audit trail, which is required of all accessible voting units used in King County. However, claims about how easy it is to hack into a voting machine have not been substantiated outside of a lab or under real elections conditions, procedures, safeguards, audits and scrutiny. In King County, voting machines are not linked to the Internet or any computer network. Yet software alone does not protect an election. The logic and accuracy tests, hash code testing, bipartisan poll workers, poll worker training, strong procedures and post-election audit of vote counting equipment are what guard against threats to the system and protect elections. There are also partisan and non-partisan observers present during all election processes, which are all open to the public. Furthermore, no single staff person has access to votes—all access is only in the presence of at least one other qualified staff person and each have separate access codes. Although the media has rightly pointed out many of the problems with election processes nationwide, they have failed to highlight the significant reforms that have been and continue to be made to ensure that every vote counts. They also fail to mention that the vast majority of glitches in other counties involve human errors or a lack of procedures. My staff and I feel very confident that our equipment is accurate, and the data we have backs up the results for the most recent elections. We have also refined, strengthened and tested our procedures in the past two years, and are well prepared for next Tuesday’s election. What’s Being Done to Safeguard the Election Process in King County To protect against potential hacks and other threats to our systems, including human error, King County Elections has put in place several important safeguards and procedures here in King County to ensure every vote is accurately cast, recorded, and tabulated. They include: Multiple Testing, certification and quality checks for King County’s Voting System. A voting system must pass three levels of tests before it can be used in Washington:
King County Elections is restricted to using voting systems, equipment and software that have been certified through the Washington’s Secretary of State's Office. Once the equipment is certified by State and Federal agencies, King County Elections conducts further quality checks through strict procedural acceptance testing of voting equipment. Automatic auditing of paper records. Washington State law requires every accessible voting unit contain a voter verified paper audit trail (VVPAT). This VVPAT is kept in a secure location and is only opened by King County election officials for auditing purposes or in the event of a recount. Random audits are done to catch fraud or mistakes in the vote totals. The audited machines are randomly selected by political party observers and the entire auditing process and all auditing procedures are open to the public and party observers. Audits in the May special election and September primary comparing the electronic results to the voter verifiable paper audit trail were 100 percent accurate. Ban on wireless components on all voting machines. Accessible voting units in King County have no wireless components. The units are not networked to each other, nor are they ever connected to the Internet or an intranet. King County results are manually uploaded, rather than being sent in by modem, to enhance security. Local control and video surveillance of the ballot layout and programming process. Members of King County Elections staff are responsible for ballot layout and the programming forall elections administered in King County. The process takes place in county elections offices under camera surveillance with controlled and tracked access. The “live election database” used for cumulating results and certifying the election is created by and under control of King County elections staff at all times. Effective procedures for addressing evidence of fraud or error. In the event of evidence of fraud or a malfunction, Washington State Law requires that a report detailing the facts and circumstances be made to the county canvassing board. Stand-alone server architecture Stand-alone computer servers are used to host the ballot tabulation, and building program used by King County. They are not connected to an intranet or the Internet. The servers are stored in locked cabinets in secure, access controlled rooms and/or cages. Logging into the servers and ballot programming requires dual passwords requiring two authorized staff. HASH code-tested software To ensure that King County uses the exact same programming code tested by the Independent Testing Authorities and certified by the federal government, the software components of the tabulating system used in King County are code tested line for line. The software programming code provided to King County by the vendor has been proven to be exactly the same as the programming code deposited in the National Institute of Science and Technology Software Library. (King County Elections voting systems software has undergone and passed a hash code test. A hash code is a large number computed from the entire string of bits that form the file. The hash code is computed in such a way that if one bit in the file is changed, a completely different hash code is produced. See http://www.nist.gov for more info.) Procedural checks for logic and accuracy Before every election, the entire vote tabulation system, including each accessible voting unit undergoes rigorous logic and accuracy testing. The process checks that each machine properly records, counts and tabulates results correctly. The tabulation system and each voting machine must pass logic and accuracy testing before it is set for the election, and then the election database is sealed and the memory card for each unit is sealed in the unit to prevent tampering. An extensive audit trail is maintained of this process, including detailed checklists. Secured ballot storage All electronic media storage used in accessible voting units is tracked and accounted for in the same way paper ballots are handled, throughout the entire elections process. Encrypted election-specific codes The tabulation system for the accessible voting units utilizes a Key Card Tool encryption program that sets an encrypted code that is required for any voter card, supervisor card or memory card to be used in a device. The code is changed prior to each election by King County staff. This encryption protects against memory and voter access cards from previous elections or from outside the King County election environment being used in a current election. Backup memory storage on Accessible Voting Units The ballot selections made by voters are stored in three locations: In a printed version on the voter verified paper audit trail; in flash memory within the accessible voting unit tablet; and on an internal memory card stored and secured with a tamper-evident seal within the voting device. The electronic results are encrypted in both the flash memory and on the memory card. In the event of a recount, the paper ballot or VVPAT becomes the official ballot. Please do not hesitate to direct any questions or concerns my way. While our first priority is to conduct the election next week, I will make every effort to respond to any questions you might have about the procedures we have in place to safeguard our elections. Sincerely, Jim Buck |
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Updated: Nov. 2, 2006
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